1. Introduction: The Violence that Swept Syria’s Coastal Region in March 2025
On 6 March 2025, the first spark of what came to be known as the “Coastal Events” was ignited. Following the killing of more than fifteen security personnel in coordinated ambushes in Jableh and other coastal areas, the Syrian authorities launched a large-scale security campaign targeting what they described as “remnants of the former regime” in the governorates of Homs, Latakia, and Tartous. These rapid developments coincided with a widespread circulation of misleading and unreliable news across social media and traditional media platforms. This atmosphere led to heightened sectarian tensions, particularly in areas inhabited by members of the Sunni community, where the events were perceived as a “coup attempt” led by supporters of the ousted president Bashar al-Assad (who belongs to the Alawite sect).
Numerous cities witnessed demonstrations in support of the military campaign launched by the Syrian authorities in the coastal areas that were considered the stronghold of the Alawite community in Syria. Calls for a “general mobilization” also spread through mosque loudspeakers, while hate speech, incitement to violence, and open calls for the “extermination of Alawites” circulated widely on social media platforms.[1]
Amid this political and security atmosphere, the widespread dissemination of misinformation and conspiracy theories played a central role in fueling the mass and indiscriminate violence that engulfed the coastal region during March 2025. By amplifying events and presenting them through simplistic or inflammatory narratives, such information contributed to deepening sectarian divisions and stoking sentiments of hatred and revenge among various segments of the population. This coincided with a surge in hate speech on social media and from religious platforms, which served to demonize “the other” and justify acts of violence against them, ultimately worsening the situation and driving it out of control.
This report comes amid an unprecedented rise in hate speech in Syria, particularly following the wave of violence in the coastal region. It aims to analyze the role hate speech played in fueling this violence, examine the related legal and human rights context, highlight existing legal gaps, and offer practical recommendations to curb incitement and promote civil peace during the transitional period.
2. The Contentious Nature of Injustice in Syrian History
Since 2011, Syria has witnessed an armed conflict that frequently took on a sectarian character. The conflict was driven by a range of deeply rooted injustices and perceived wrongs, reflective of the multitude of actors involved. Notably, Sunni communities expressed a sense of marginalization that stood in contrast to the historical narratives of injustice voiced by Shi’a, Alawite, and Druze communities, alongside long-standing Kurdish claims, and tensions between rural populations and urban elites. It is important to note that most of these claims are grounded in real experiences of oppression endured by various segments of Syrian society over six decades of authoritarian rule. Moreover, some of these sentiments trace back to earlier historical periods.
Thus, over the past fourteen years, Syrian society has endured a complex conflict that, at many turning points, assumed the form of a civil war. It left behind deep scars and rifts among different communities, intensified perceptions of injustice, and, in many cases, generated a sense of existential threat among most segments of society. It is well known that civil conflicts provide fertile ground for the spread of hate speech and incitement to violence based on sectarian or ethnic grounds. The situation is exacerbated when parties to the conflict deliberately exploit such speech and incorporate it into their official and media discourse, often invoking the grievances of the group they claim to represent, especially in a context marked by the widespread availability of unregulated weapons.
3. Hate Speech in International Covenants and Instruments
According to the United Nations, hate speech is defined as any kind of communication in speech, writing, or behavior that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender, or other identity factors.
International law prohibits incitement to hatred, discrimination, and violence, as outlined in Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
Given the conceptual overlap between freedom of expression and hate speech in some contexts, there is a need to draw clear boundaries between the two. While freedom of expression must be protected, it may be restricted in accordance with the permissible limitations under international human rights law. At the same time, freedom of expression cannot be used as a shield to justify speech that incites hatred or violence.
To ensure a proper balance between countering hate speech and protecting freedom of expression, “ARTICLE 19” introduced the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality in 2009. These principles define “hatred” and “hostility” as intense and irrational emotions of opprobrium, enmity, and detestation towards a target group, “advocacy of violence” as the public promotion of such hostility, and “incitement” as statements that pose a real and imminent risk of discrimination, hostility, or violence against members of a group.
Similarly, the Rabat Plan of Action proposes six threshold tests to identify and assess incitement to hatred:
- Context: The social and political environment in which the speech occurs plays a critical role in assessing whether it constitutes incitement.
- Speaker: The position or status of the speaker in society increases the potential impact of the speech.
- Intent: Whether the speaker intended to incite hatred or violence against a particular group must be evaluated.
- Content and Form: The nature of the speech, including the tone, language, imagery, and symbolism, is crucial in determining its potential for harm.
- Extent of the Speech Act: Extent includes such elements as the reach of the speech act, its public nature, its magnitude and size of its audience, affects the likelihood of harm.
- Likelihood, including Imminent: The reasonable probability that the speech will succeed in inciting actual action against the target group.
As will be demonstrated in the following sections of this report, many examples of hate speech that circulated among Syrians during the coastal events meet these six criteria, leaving no ambiguity that what was disseminated constituted hate speech and incitement to violence; forms of expression that must be countered, not protected under the guise of free speech.
4. Hate Speech under Syrian Law
The Constitutional Declaration, issued in March 2025, constitutes the primary legal instrument in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and up to the date of this report. In relation to the subject at hand, although the Declaration emphasizes the principles of national unity and peaceful coexistence, it lacks an explicit provision criminalizing hate speech. Article 7 of the Declaration prohibits incitement to discord, division, and sectarianism. It reads: “The State shall be committed to fostering coexistence and societal stability, preserving civil peace, and preventing all forms of discord, division, sectarian agitation, and incitement to violence.” However, this provision falls short of constituting a clear criminalization of all forms of incitement to hatred, violence, or discrimination on sectarian or ethnic grounds.
Therefore, STJ considers Article 7 of the Constitutional Declaration insufficient for addressing the problem of hate speech in Syria, for two main reasons:
First, Article 7 focuses on preventing discriminatory acts by the State and does not explicitly address hate speech originating from individuals or non-governmental entities. As such, relying solely on this provision to combat hate speech is unlikely to be effective. Non-discrimination clauses are typically intended to ensure equal treatment under the law, whereas hate speech often emanates from private actors, making Article 7 an inadequate legal remedy in such cases.
Second, although Article 7’s prohibition of incitement to violence may provide a legal basis for addressing one form of hate speech, international standards –chief among them the Rabat Plan of Action– emphasize that hate speech can cause significant harm even when it does not amount to direct incitement to violence. Therefore, relying exclusively on Article 7 would leave many harmful expressions outside the scope of legal regulation. While incitement to violence is one of the most dangerous forms of speech and should indeed be prohibited, hate speech also includes expressions that dehumanize certain groups, or reinforce discriminatory stereotypes and attitudes, even in the absence of a direct call for violence.
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[1] Syrians for Truth and Justice. Syria: Serious Concerns Regarding Integrity, Independence, and Effectiveness of the Investigation Committee for Coastal Events. 7 April 2025