1. Executive Summary
This expanded study by Syrians for Truth and Justice and PÊL – Civil Waves, examines the reality of decentralisation in Syria from a human rights perspective and considers whether it can serve as an entry point for redistributing power and resources and strengthening local participation during and beyond the transitional period.
This document is based on an analysis of Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011, the constitutional framework and related legislation, as well as a review of comparative experiences and nine in-depth interviews conducted by Syrians for Truth and Justice in June 2026.
The discussion of decentralisation is particularly important during the transitional period because rebuilding the State is not limited to replacing individuals or restoring institutions to operation. It requires reconsidering the distribution of power and resources and addressing marginalisation, inadequate representation, and disparities in development and services.
At the same time, decentralisation raises concerns relating to partition, the entrenchment of spheres of influence, unequal resources, and the potential capture of new institutions by armed groups or local elites. The debate should therefore not be reduced to a simplistic opposition between centralisation that preserves the unity of the State and decentralisation that leads to secession. Excessive centralisation may deepen marginalisation, while decentralisation, if it lacks safeguards and shared national institutions, may become a means of entrenching divisions or reproducing authoritarianism at the local level.[1]
The study concludes that Syria does not apply genuine decentralisation. Local authorities have remained largely subordinate to ministries and appointed governors, without sufficient autonomy over decision-making, resources, or the management of executive bodies. The transfer of certain ministerial powers to governors likewise does not constitute decentralisation, but remains a form of administrative deconcentration: a transfer of authority within the executive apparatus itself, from a ministry to an appointed local official, unless those powers are transferred to elected local institutions that are accountable to residents.
The analysis of Law No. 107 further demonstrates that its failure is attributable not only to weak implementation, but also to its structure. Although the Law recognises the legal personality of administrative units—governorates, cities, towns, and municipalities—provides for the election of their councils, and grants them service-delivery and development functions, it retains the appointed governor as both the representative of the central authority and the head of the local executive authority, and subjects council decisions and budgets to extensive central oversight and administrative tutelage.
It is therefore insufficient to implement the Law in its current form or to introduce partial amendments. The legal and constitutional framework for local government must be rebuilt.
The report proposes the adoption of broad administrative and fiscal decentralisation with democratic substance, constitutionally protected within a unitary State. Under this model, residents elect local councils, while local executive authorities are either directly elected or formed by, and accountable to, the elected councils. The model also separates the central government’s representative in the governorate—whose role is confined to coordination and ensuring compliance with the law—from the head of the local administration, who is responsible for implementing the local council’s decisions. It also requires a clear delineation of national, local, and shared competences, while defence, foreign policy, nationality, currency, and national service standards remain within the competence of central national institutions.
The proposed model also requires genuine fiscal autonomy, based on stable local revenues, a share of national revenues, transfers allocated according to published criteria, and an equalisation fund that prevents disparities between regions from widening. Natural resources must remain public property belonging to all Syrians, with a fair share of their revenues allocated to producing regions and regions affected in environmental and development terms.
The report recommends that the new Constitution include a dedicated chapter on local government; that Law No. 107 be redrafted; that free and democratic local elections be held; that the power to dissolve councils or suspend their decisions by executive action be abolished; and that central oversight be limited to reviewing the legality of local decisions, with disputes adjudicated by an independent judiciary. It also calls for the draft amendment to the Law to be published and subjected to public consultation; for every transfer of competence to be accompanied by the transfer of the necessary resources and personnel; for the representation of women, displaced persons, and under-represented communities to be ensured; and for local budgets, contracts, and procurement to be subject to transparency and independent audit.
The report does not present decentralisation as a stand-alone solution to the Syrian crisis or as synonymous with federalism. Rather, it regards decentralisation as part of a broader reform that rebuilds the State on the basis of participation, accountability, and equal rights as individuals and communities, and transforms the country’s unity from centralisation imposed from above into a constitutional partnership between national institutions and local communities.
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[1] Erin C. Houlihan and Sharon Pia Hickey, Constitutional Approaches to Decentralization: Elements, Challenges and Implications, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2023, particularly the sections concerning the risks of weak design, ambiguity of roles, accountability, minorities, and women.