

"De Facto Authority Without Legitimacy": A Legal Study on the 'Harasta Shura Council' After Assad



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1. Introduction and Background

The Shura Council of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was founded in 2017, in conjunction with the announcement of HTS's formation as a merger of several jihadist factions, most notably Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Jabhat Ansar al-Din.¹ This union aimed to establish a more cohesive governing body capable of managing HTS-held territories and addressing military and political challenges. Accordingly, a need emerged for a high-level religious-consultative body to legitimize executive decisions and ensure broader leadership participation in decision-making.² Thus, the Shura Council was formed, comprising leading figures from the founding factions and influential independent individuals.³

In 2019, HTS announced the establishment of the "General Shura Council"⁴ as a body akin to a "People's Assembly,"⁵ to reflect its openness toward the societal fabric in northwestern Syria. The council was tasked with representing both original residents and internally displaced persons in HTS-controlled areas⁶ and with acting as a substitute for formal parliamentary structures.⁷

This report, prepared by the Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), traces the political and historical context behind the formation of the General Shura Council affiliated with HTS. It examines the council's evolution before the fall of the regime, then tracks changes following HTS's takeover of Damascus and its expanding influence. The report also explores the link between this central council and local Shura Councils established in several Syrian towns, with a case study focused on the Harasta Shura Council. It documents the council's intervention in civil and administrative affairs –extending to education, health, and humanitarian sectors– through field testimonies. The report concludes with a legal analysis of these practices and presents recommendations to the transitional government, which STJ views as essential to ensuring the rule of law and restoring institutional governance in Syria.

¹ Omran Strategic Studies. [The Role of Jihadi Movements in Syrian Local Governance](#). 14 July 2017

² Legitimate Authority in Jihadist Organizations. Yasmin Jamoul – Mukhtar Awfa. 19 September 2024. Original title in Arabic: [السلطة الشرعية في التنظيمات الجهادية](#).

³ It is headed by Abdul Rahim Atoun, and its members include Mazhar al-Wais, the Iraqi Maysar al-Jabouri (Abu Maria al-Qahtani), Mustafa Hamdan (Abu al-Harith al-Zabadani), among others. For more details, see: Legitimate Authority in Jihadist Organizations. Yasmin Jamoul – Mukhtar Awfa. 19 September 2024. Original title in Arabic: [السلطة الشرعية في التنظيمات الجهادية](#).

⁴ The General Shura Council's online presence includes a [YouTube](#) channel, where the last video was published on 11 September 2024. No content has been released since the fall of the Assad regime or during "Operation Deterrence of Aggression." The Council also operates a [Telegram](#) channel, where the last post was a congratulatory statement on the "liberation of the land," published on 30 November 2024, two days after the launch of Operation Deterrence of Aggression.

⁵ Jusoor. [Searching for Spaces for Effectiveness.. What is Behind the Recent Resignations in Idlib](#). 10 April 2020.

⁶ Enab Baladi. [Al-Jolani: The one-man rule](#). 22 April 2024.

⁷ Syria TV, "Plans to Invite International Observers: The General Shura Council Approves Electoral Law in Idlib," 11 August 2024. Original title in Arabic: [خطط لدعوة مراقبين دوليين.. مجلس الشورى العام يقر قانون الانتخابات في إدلب](#)

2. The Formation and Evolution of the Shura Council

This section reviews the political and historical context of the General Shura Council (2019) and the transformations it underwent before and after the fall of the Assad regime.

I. Northwestern Syria Before the Fall of the Assad Regime

Based on information and testimonies collected by STJ, and crosschecked with open-source analyses and news reports,⁸ the key stages in the establishment and evolution of the General Shura Council can be outlined as follows:

- **The Syrian General Conference and the Formation of the Salvation Government (2017):** Held in October 2017 in the Bab al-Hawa area under HTS supervision, the Syrian General Conference led to the establishment of a “Founding Committee,” which subsequently announced the formation of the Salvation Government, comprising 11 ministers under the leadership of [Mohammad Ahmad al-Sheikh](#). This move was intended to add a civilian and organizational character to HTS’s governance in liberated northern Syria.
- **Formation of the General Shura Council and Launch of its First Session (2019):** On 30 March 2019, the Salvation Government announced the formation of the “Shura Council of Northern Syria,” composed of 107 members, following elections largely boycotted by the population. The council was said to include representatives of all areas and displaced communities. [Dr. Bassam Sahyouni](#) was elected president (he later resigned in 2020),⁹

⁸ See for example: Omran Strategic Studies. [The Role of Jihadi Movements in Syrian Local Governance](#). 14 July 2017. See also: Jusoor. The Salvation Government and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: Debating the Nature and Future of Their Relationship. 6 April 2022. Original title in Arabic: [حكومة الإنقاذ وهيئة تحرير الشام.. جدل العلاقة ومستقبلها](#). See also: Noon Post. Can the Salvation Government Affiliated with HTS Succeed in Establishing Civil Institutions?. 26 February 2019. Original title in Arabic: [هل تنجح حكومة الإنقاذ التابعة لتحرير الشام في تأسيس مؤسسات مدنية](#). See also: Radio Al-Kul. HTS Announces the Electoral Mechanism for the New Shura Council and Sets Candidacy and Voting Conditions. 1 June 2024. Original title in Arabic: [الهيئة تعلن آلية انتخابات مجلس الشورى الجديد وتحدد شروط الترشح والانتخاب](#). See also: Baladi News. HTS Holds the First Meeting of Its Shura Council. 6 April 2019. [تحرير الشام تعقد اجتماعها الأول](#). [لمجلس الشورى](#). See also: Syria TV. A New Model of HTS Pragmatism: Launching the Second Version of the Shura Council in Idlib. 30 November 2021. Original title in Arabic: [نموذج جديد لـ"براماتية الهيئة".. إطلاق النسخة الثانية لمجلس الشورى في إدلب](#). See also: Enab Baladi. [Al-Jolani: The one-man rule](#). 22 April 2024. See also: Syria TV, “Plans to Invite International Observers: The General Shura Council Approves Electoral Law in Idlib,” 11 August 2024. Original title in Arabic: [خطط لدعوة مراقبين دوليين.. مجلس الشورى العام يقر قانون الانتخابات في إدلب](#).

⁹ Later, coinciding with the General Shura Council’s adoption of the electoral law in Idlib in August 2024, Dr. Bassam Sahyouni expressed doubts about the integrity of the Council and the elections it intended to hold in HTS-controlled areas of Idlib Governorate. In a post on his Telegram channel, he stated that the slogan “a free and fair Shura Council” was a “vague expression that conceals behind it backstage dealings that began months ago and have yet to end.” He added: “Someone told me that he was offered a seat on the Shura Council by officials from the group [HTS], so what laws are you talking about? And what freedom of choice are you referring to?” Sahyouni went on to say that the person in charge of overseeing the Shura Council file within HTS “is the same individual who previously destroyed the council and stripped it of its powers,” stressing that the current council president “cannot do anything without his permission.” He continued: “When we asked why he remained in charge despite their acknowledgment that he had corrupted the council, they answered, ‘because the Shura file is his.’” He concluded: “Let it be known that the talk of forming a free Shura is nothing but a new lie and another deception that will not fool the wise. What is publicly portrayed as open discussion is merely a smokescreen, an all-too-familiar, staged performance.” Source: Syria TV, “Plans to Invite International

with Imad Shaaban and Abdul Karim Barakat as vice presidents, and Badri al-Masloukh as secretary.

- **Council's Role and Second Term (2021):** HTS sought to strengthen the General Shura Council as a quasi-parliament after its 2019 launch. Elections for its second term were held on 25 October 2021. Mustafa Mousa was elected president, with Mohammad Habbal and Abdul Karim Barakat as vice presidents, and Badri al-Abdullah as secretary. This term marked expanded representation, including a broader spectrum of displaced individuals from various provinces, as well as extensive representation from HTS- and Salvation Government-affiliated unions and bodies established in 2019 and 2020. Nevertheless, the elections were widely criticized as token, with pre-approved winning lists comprising HTS-affiliated candidates and individuals linked to its unions and institutions.
- **Legal Framework Development and Preparations for the Third Term (2024):** On 11 August 2024, the council's Higher Elections Committee approved a new electoral law for the 2024–2026 term. The law adopted open lists and allocated seats based on population distribution across provinces, in two groups: the general population and individuals with academic qualifications. The council also launched an online platform inviting international observers and human rights organizations to monitor the election's transparency. Committee president Issam al-Khalif stated that the council president would announce the election date at least 30 days in advance, detailing seat allocations and eligibility criteria for candidates and voters. However, the elections were never held, and no official clarification was issued.

II. Syria After the Fall of the Assad Regime

Following the launch of “Operation Deterrence of Aggression” on 27 November 2025, which ended with Bashar al-Assad’s flight and the collapse of his regime, HTS assumed power in Damascus, and its leader Ahmad al-Shara was declared interim president of Syria. The Salvation Government was relocated from Idlib to the capital to serve as a caretaker government under Prime Minister Mohammad al-Bashir. With HTS’s governing apparatus moving from northwestern Syria to Damascus, several General Shura Council members –many of whom had fought in the operation– returned to their home areas, taking on administrative roles under the title of “Local Shura Councils.”

STJ documented the activity of such councils in areas including [Harasta](#), [Hazzah](#), and [al-Bahariyah](#) (in the Damascus countryside), and [Nawa](#) (in the Daraa countryside), in addition to several [tribal Shura Councils](#) across Syria. A source from the Media Office of the Harasta Shura Council told Lebanon’s An-Nahar newspaper (in an [article](#) published on 11 April 2025) that “similar councils exist in many towns in Eastern Ghouta under various names, a practice well known in those areas.”¹⁰

Observers: The General Shura Council Approves Electoral Law in Idlib,” 11 August 2024. Original title in Arabic: [خطط لدعوة مراقبين دوليين.. مجلس الشورى العام يقر قانون الانتخابات في إدلب](#).

¹⁰ A body known as the “Council of Duma Notables” is active in the city of Duma in the Damascus countryside. It is headed by Ahmad Taha (Abu Subhi), a former commander in “Jaysh al-Ummah.” See: [Statement Issued by the Council of Duma Notables](#), published via the “Sada al-Thawra” Facebook page on 12 May 2025.

3. Case Study: The Harasta Shura Council

This section presents a case study of the Harasta Shura Council as an example of localized governance patterns after the regime's collapse. The study is based on multiple testimonies illustrating the council's authority and its interventions in various sectors, including education, health, and humanitarian relief.

3.1. Review of the Incident Concerning Journalist Haneen Omran

On 3 April 2025, Haneen Omran, a correspondent for Syria TV, appeared in a livestream on her Facebook page from inside her car in Harasta. She reported that a man named Mohammad Alaya (Abu Majed), described as a "security official" with the local Shura Council, had assaulted her crew. In the [video](#), she stated that her cameraman had been physically attacked, and that their press credentials –issued by Syria TV and the Ministry of Information of the interim government– were forcibly confiscated. Alaya also appeared in the livestream, threatening to prevent the team from leaving the city if they continued recording.

The incident provoked widespread debate among Syrians. One major point of controversy was the revelation of the Harasta Shura Council's existence and the broad powers it exercised. Omran stated during the livestream: **"Harasta appears to be outside the Syrian state... The Shura Council here controls the city as it pleases and enjoys absolute authority. I don't know where it comes from."**

The following day (4 April 2025), Omran published another [video](#) clarifying that the incident **"was not with an official entity (the General Security) or even with the Harasta Shura Council itself,"** but rather a personal altercation with Abu Majed Alaya, who had seized their press IDs and physically pushed the cameraman. She added that she had received numerous complaints from Harasta residents about Alaya's abuses of power and exploitation of his position. Omran apologized to "the people of Harasta and Eastern Ghouta," stating she had no intention to offend anyone and had deleted the video after being contacted by **"the head of the Media Directorate in Damascus countryside, the Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Media, her supervisor in Syria TV, and various local security officials in Harasta"**.

STJ documented a smear campaign against Haneen Omran following the incident in April 2025, with social media posts accusing her –explicitly or implicitly– of collaborating with the former regime. Some users cited the pro-Assad stance of certain family members as evidence of her alleged loyalties.¹¹

While official authorities remained silent for days (until mid-April), these accusations were weaponized to pressure Omran into publicly apologizing to "the people of Harasta," the "Shura Council," and "security official Abu Majed Alaya." On 6 April 2025, Alaya appeared in a video denying he assaulted the cameraman, accusing Omran of insulting Harasta and its residents, and claiming his response had been "more lenient than necessary."¹²

¹¹ See: [link 1](#), [link 2](#), [link 3](#), [link 4](#), [link 5](#).

¹² [Video](#) published on the "Harasta City" Facebook page on 6 April 2025.



Image 1: Social media [posts](#) accusing journalist Haneen Omran and her brother of committing grave violations against the revolutionaries.



Image 2: A Facebook [post](#) published on 4 April 2025 by Syrian journalist Eyas Ghaleb al-Rashid (14k followers), attacking Omran's credibility and mocking her sectarian background and plea to the Minister of Media.



Image 3: Image 3. A Facebook [post](#) by an activist attacks journalist Haneen Omran, accusing her of belonging to a family affiliated with the "National Defense" militias and alleging that she changed her name to hide her family background. The author of the post questions her political motives, accusing her of "imitative behavior," and calls for her arrest and investigation for what he describes as "overstepping against the state and the revolution," as well as "incitement" and "assault." The post holds these behaviors responsible for the potential occurrence of "chaos and a breakdown of security."

On 7 May 2025, Omran posted a [photo](#) of herself with Syrian Minister of Media, Hamzeh al-Mustafa. A few days later, on 22 May, Mohammad al-Saleh, PR manager of Media Relations at the Syrian Ministry of Media, published a [photo](#) showing the journalist alongside the security official Abu Majed Alaya. The post included a caption stating: **"The meeting ended in reconciliation, with mutual recognition of each party's revolutionary history. Any abuse or defamation against journalists or activists is wholly unacceptable."** (Image 4).



Image 4: A Facebook [post](#) by Mohammad al-Saleh (Ministry of Media PR Manager) on 22 May 2025, featuring a photo of Omran and Alaya.

3.2.The Rise of the Harasta Shura Council: De Facto Power After Assad Regime Collapse

The "Harasta Shura Council of the Displaced" was established in northwestern Syria in 2019 to coordinate services, aid, and oversee military and civil affairs for displaced Harasta residents in Kurdish Afrin, in western Aleppo countryside. Testimonies collected by STJ indicate the council leveraged its members' ties to armed factions, particularly Jaysh al-Islam, to expand its influence and dominate aid and medical assistance efforts for displaced Harasta communities.

These testimonies also note that with the opposition advance –led by HTS– toward Damascus, the Harasta Shura Council and its founder, Misbah Abdul Jalil (a former opposition fighter known as “Abu Ali al-Qaqaa”), rose to prominence. Witnesses say Abdul Jalil was recently appointed as Harasta’s “Security Emir” and appointed fellow fighters to key positions, thereby entrenching the council’s control.

Abdul Jalil appeared in a [video](#) from Homs during “Operation Deterrence of Aggression,” declaring the imminent return to Harasta and warning “collaborators with tyrants” of retribution. Following the fall of Damascus on 8 December 2024, the council rapidly asserted dominance over Harasta as a temporary stabilizing force, according to witnesses. However, this authority has persisted due to the continued presence of council members with combat roles in the operation.¹³

From the first days after the regime’s fall, the council assumed administrative and security functions: it held [organizational meetings](#) with fighters and civilians, issued [regulations](#) and [circulars](#) –unauthorized by the government– bearing only the council’s seal, and controlled daily life from traffic rules to disarmament. It also [managed “settlement” procedures](#) for former regime affiliates, enforcing decisions under its own authority.

Despite the transitional administration appointing a local civil council and resuming state institution operations in Harasta, the Shura Council continued expanding its role, establishing a security detachment and wide-ranging service committees covering civil affairs, including education and health. Council members justified this by citing poor public services and weak public institutions. A member of Harasta Shura Council told STJ that the council plays a “supervisory and advisory” role over the civil council in all service sectors.

Moreover, a member of the Local Civil Council told STJ that this dual authority “has disrupted both residents and official institutions.” He stated:

“The civil council cannot perform its duties due to the Shura Council’s interference. Days after the regime’s fall, al-Qaqaa stormed the council with armed men, declaring, ‘I’m in charge of Harasta... You must coordinate everything through me.’ Despite multiple attempts to hold joint meetings, nothing changed... The Shura Council holds greater power on the ground due to its control over local security. It imposes its will through force and runs the city as it pleases.”

He concluded:

“We fear for our lives and property. They have been involved in numerous violations since the early days of the revolution.”

¹³ On 29 January 2025, Al-Thawra newspaper published an article titled “The Shura Council Meets with the People of Harasta and Upcoming Reconstruction Projects.” (Original title in Arabic: [مجلس الشورى يلتقي بأهالي حرستا](#) ومشاريع قادمة لإعادة الإعمار). The article highlighted the Shura Council’s achievements “since taking charge and beginning its work” in the city. It affirmed the Council’s assumption of direct responsibility for overseeing public services, including education and security, as well as the maintenance of water and electricity networks, in addition to humanitarian efforts, aid distribution, and managing donations for the residents of the city.

3.3.Education Sector: Arbitrary Dismissals Under Religious Pretexts

On 21 January 2025, according to a testimony documented by STJ, the head of the Harasta Shura Council, accompanied by several members, visited the city's girls' school to inform the administration that the council would henceforth oversee the education portfolio, thus bypassing both the Ministry of Education and the local civil council. Without issuing any official directive, the council appointed an educational supervisor for the school. Within days, this supervisor began implementing sweeping staff changes, notably dismissing a large number of male teachers and replacing them with female staff, regardless of their qualifications.

One school employee told STJ that all attempts to challenge or discuss the council's decisions were met with hostility and religious extremism. Council members invoked justifications such as **"the prohibition of gender mixing"** and issued offensive statements claiming most female staff were **"unfit for leadership due to improper dress."** These measures were implemented without any legal basis, relying solely on verbal orders and in the complete absence of government oversight. The employee added that a formal complaint had been submitted long ago but remained unanswered.

3.4.Health Sector: Unlawful Appointments and Threats to Medical Staff

The Shura Council also intervened in the health sector in Harasta, making staffing decisions and altering services at the city's main health center. A member of the Harasta health center staff confirmed to STJ that on 12 January 2025, a Shura Council delegation informed employees that, **"as of today, your affiliation is with the Shura Council."**

The source added:

"Al-Qaqaa and his entourage rejected the medical staff's request to remain under the Ministry of Health's authority, claiming the ministry was still full of regime loyalists, and that the Shura Council would take over the task of 'cleansing' the center in the meantime."

The council then appointed a nurse –one of its members– as the new manager, without any formal appointment letter. The medical team faced threats and accusations of past collaboration with the regime. These interventions led to the resignation of the center's manager and the arbitrary dismissal of several nurses.

3.5.Humanitarian Sector: Politically-Motivated Interference

The Shura Council also targeted the local charitable association affiliated with the municipal council, which is responsible for collecting donations and distributing aid to the most vulnerable. According to a confidential source interviewed by STJ, on 20 January 2025, the council summoned the association's director and accused him of embezzling donations and collaborating with the former regime, without presenting any evidence.

The source said that the director was severely beaten by council members under the direct orders of the council leader, who insulted him, calling him **"a regime lapdog who used to live under the regime's control."** He was held in a basement under the council's headquarters

overnight and then released the next day after being verbally informed of his dismissal and replaced by someone appointed by the council. The source also reported that council members later looted aid supplies from the association's warehouse and divided them among themselves.

3.6. Structure of the Harasta Shura Council

According to the aforementioned [article](#) published in Lebanon's An-Nahar newspaper, the Harasta Shura Council –headed by Misbah Abdul Jalil– consists of the following six members:

- Mustafa Saqr (Abu Omar) – Civil engineer
- Mohammad al-Abbas (Abu Yassin) – Graduate in Islamic missionary studies
- Sheikh Mohammad Sadiqa (Abu Ahmad) – One of Eastern Ghouta's most senior Quran reciters
- Mahmoud al-Nimr (Abu Ahmad) – Head of the Damascus goldsmiths' syndicate
- Sheikh Mohammad Ali Sheikh Darwish (Abu Haitham) – Graduate of Al-Fath Islamic Institute and certified Quran reciter
- Hussein Ghbeis (Abu Ibrahim al-Asmar) – Third-year political science student at the University of Aleppo

Four additional members were later added from outside the displaced community in Aleppo's countryside, bringing the total to ten:

- Ahmad Taha Jumaa – Dentist
- Ahmad Suleiman – General surgeon
- Ibrahim al-Ghalayini – Electrical engineer
- Mohammad al-Jabahji – Mathematics teacher with a university degree

The council's media office explained that these additions were made “to reinforce the principle of inclusivity and to avoid restricting the council's work to the displaced community, while also benefiting from the experience of those who lived under the previous regime.”

4. Legal Opinion

[The Constitutional Declaration](#) of 13 March 2025 affirms the continued validity of existing Syrian laws unless repealed or amended. Therefore, all actions and decisions must comply with these laws. The establishment of the so-called Harasta Shura Council and its exercise of administrative and security authority in the city constitute a blatant violation of constitutional legitimacy and the rule of law. No entity may exercise public authority without legal authorization, and there is no legislation establishing or mandating such a council.

Moreover, [Local Administration Law No. 107 of 2011](#), still in force, defines the administrative structure of local units. It contains no provisions permitting the creation of parallel bodies to local councils or granting them executive, security, or supervisory powers.

The council's unilateral decisions to appoint or dismiss workers in the education and health sectors, without formal decisions from competent authorities, directly contravene [Public Servants Law No. 50 of 2004](#) that specifies procedures for hiring, transfer, and dismissal. Dismissal is a serious disciplinary penalty that may only be imposed through a decision by the

Disciplinary Court for public employees. The role of public institutions is limited to implementing such rulings, which was not followed in the cases described in this report.

Physical and verbal assaults, in addition to cases of arbitrary detention perpetrated by the Shura Council against journalists, civilians, and health and administrative workers, are criminal offenses under [Syrian Penal Code No. 148 of 1949](#). Relevant provisions include those addressing libel, assault, bodily harm, and unlawful detention. These acts also violate [Anti-Torture Law No. 16 of 2022](#), which defines torture as any act causing severe physical or psychological pain, committed by or at the instigation of public officials, or for personal, political, or retaliatory purposes.

Beyond their clear illegality under Syrian law, the actions of the Harasta Shura Council also breach Syria's international obligations under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights \(ICCPR\)](#), to which Syria acceded in 1969. Article 9 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to liberty and personal security, prohibiting arbitrary arrest or detention. Article 19 ensures the right to freedom of expression, and Article 25 protects participation in public affairs through lawful representatives. Practices such as arbitrary dismissals, attacks on journalists and civilians, and unauthorized control over public institutions violate these provisions and demand legal accountability. The transitional government is therefore obliged to end these violations and uphold international standards in constructing local governance.

5. Recommendations

The Shura Council's continued exercise of state functions without accountability –particularly in the absence of government intervention– risks entrenching dual power structures, weakening state institutions, and undermining the principle of unified state authority as enshrined in Syrian legislation. Accordingly, STJ urges the Syrian transitional authorities to:

1. Dissolve all unlawful entities exercising public authority without legal basis, including Shura Councils, deeming their decisions null and void, and referring members to investigation upon confirmation of violations;
2. Strengthen the authority and independence of legally appointed or elected Civil Local Councils, free from military or religious interference;
3. Restore full authority to the competent official institutions –such as education, health, and humanitarian aid– and prevent any unauthorized entity from interfering in their functions.
4. Initiate transparent, independent investigations into documented violations—particularly physical assaults and arbitrary detentions, and hold perpetrators accountable under applicable Syrian laws, while ensuring compensation for victims;
5. Activate the role of administrative courts and disciplinary courts in reviewing illegal appointments and dismissals;
6. Provide protection to journalists and civil society activists, ensuring they are not subjected to assault or defamation.



ABOUT STJ

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) started as an idea in a co-founder's mind while attending the U.S. Middle-East Partnership Initiative's (MEPI) Leaders for Democracy Fellowship program (LDF) in 2015. The idea became a reality and flourished into an independent, non-profit, impartial, non-governmental human rights organization.

STJ's beginnings were more than humble; initially, it only reported stories of Syrians who experienced arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, or torture. Planted in fertile soil, the seed of this project grew into an established human rights organization licensed in the Middle East and the European Union. STJ today undertakes to detect and uncover violations of all types committed in all Syrian parts by the various parties to the conflict.

Convinced that Syria's diversity is a wealth, our researchers and volunteers serve with unfailing dedication to monitor, expose, and document human rights violations that continue unabated in Syria since 2011, regardless of the affiliation of the victims or perpetrators.