

**Pro- Autonomous Administration “Asayesh Forces” Continue Closure of Kurdish (KNC) National Council Parties Offices**  
The acts which targetted the members of (KNC) constitute violations of applicable rules of international law.

## About Syrians for Truth and Justice/STJ


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Syrians  
For Truth  
& Justice



## **Pro- Autonomous Administration "Asayesh Forces" Continue Closure of Kurdish National Council Parties Offices**

*"The acts which targetted the members of the Kurdish National Council  
(KNC) constitute violations of applicable rules of international law."*



## Table of Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>The legal framework</b> .....	<b>5</b>
Applicable Law.....	5
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).....	5
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) .....	5
<b>Alleged Violations</b> .....	<b>6</b>
Freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty.....	6
Freedom of association.....	7
The Autonomous Administration must respect the right to freedom of association of individuals living in the territory under its control.....	7
<b>Dozens of Arbitrary Arrests Accompanied the Closure of Headquarters and Offices</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Continue Closure of Kurdish National Council Offices and their Affiliated Parties Since March 2017</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>Storming Offices of the Kurdish National Council/KNC and Burning Them</b> .....	<b>15</b>
A List of the Headquarters Closed in Qamishli by Autonomous Administration since March 2017.....	17
A List of the Headquarters Closed al-Malikiyah / Derik by Autonomous Administration since March 2017....	17
A List of the Headquarters Closed in Amuda by Autonomous Administration since March 2017 .....	18
A List of the Headquarters Closed in al-Hasakeh by Autonomous Administration since March 2017 .....	18
A List of the Headquarters Closed in al-Qahtaniyah/Turbe Sipi by Autonomous Administration since March 2017.....	18
A List of the Headquarters Closed in Tel Tamer by Autonomous Administration since March 2017 .....	19
A List of the Headquarters Closed in Maabadah/Girkê Legê by Autonomous Administration since March 2017 .....	19
A List of the Headquarters Closed in al-Darbasiyah by Autonomous Administration since March 2017.....	19
A List of the Headquarters Closed in al-Jawadiyah/Çil Axa by Autonomous Administration since March 2017	19
<b>Some Assaults Conducted by Rojava Youth Union since March 2017</b> .....	<b>20</b>



## Preface

Since March 2017, the security services of the Autonomous Administration led by the Democratic Community Movement/TEV-DEM and created by the [Democratic Union Party/PYD](#) and other Arabian and Assyrian parties, mainly in north-eastern Syria, have shut down offices of the Kurdish political parties and other actors in many areas under their control. This has occurred primarily in Qamishli, al-Hasakeh, Amuda and Al-Malikiayah/Derik, Ayn al-Arab/Kokanee, as well as Afrin, particularly to the parties affiliated to the [Kurdish National Council/KNC](#). They have presented numerous pretexts for these actions, including but not limited to, issues such as not having the required registrations. Meanwhile, the Asayesh forces and Anti-Terror Units - HAT are also arresting, for various reasons, dozens of Syrian Kurd activists opposed to the Autonomous Administration policy.

On March 13, 2017, the Autonomous Administration declared a [Communique](#) that all the unregistered political parties must obtain a license in Jazeera cantons under a law issued by the Administration itself on April 15, 2014. The Communique threatened that the Internal Affairs Entity will implement Decree No. 5 that requires “closing all headquarters of unlicensed political parties” no later than 24 hours from the moment of the ultimatum. There were also threats to bring to justice to those responsible, since the unlicensed party was considered illegal according to the above-mentioned law.

Actually, after the ultimatum, the Asayesh Forces launched a crackdown on most offices of Kurdish and non-Kurdish party offices, such as the Assyrian Democratic organization/ADO office, the headquarters of the KNC, offices of Youth organizations the offices of the Women's Union, among others, apart from the arbitrary arrest of dozens of Syrian Kurd activists from their homes.

Since March 2017, the Autonomous Administration encouraged its loyalists, especially those affiliated to Rojava Youth Union, to burn and assault offices of Kurdish National Council/KNC, and abduct their members in an escalation step against the Kurdish parties that constitute the KNC with the aim of completing controlling the political life in Qamishli, as reported by [Syrians for Truth and Justice](#).



## The legal framework

This following part will determine the body of law applicable to the incidents under examination before highlighting the specific international obligations breached by the Autonomous Administration.

### APPLICABLE LAW

#### INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL)

IHL is the body of law that applies during armed conflicts. In the context of a non-international armed conflict, such as the one ongoing in Syria, IHL applies to all parties to the conflict, state and non-state actors alike. More importantly, IHL applies in the whole of the territory of Syria “whether or not actual combat takes place there”<sup>1</sup>. However, it does not mean that all acts committed in the territory of Syria fall within the scope of application of IHL. In order for IHL to apply, the acts must be “closely related to the hostilities occurring in [...] territories under the control of the parties to the conflict”<sup>2</sup>. The acts committed by the Pro- Autonomous Administration “Asayesh Forces” against members of the KNC, cannot be said to be closely related to the ongoing conflict between “Kurdish forces” and other parties to the conflict. In addition, at present there is not an armed conflict between the PYD/YPG and the KNC.<sup>3</sup> Against this background, IHL does not apply to the incidents under examination.

#### INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (IHRL)

IHRL is the body of law that applies in times of peace and, with certain limitations, during armed conflicts. The applicability of human rights law in Syria is uncontroversial, however according to the traditional approach human rights obligations are binding only on states and not on other entities such as non-state actors. It is argued that the traditional approach has become progressively less persuasive and non-state actors such as the “Autonomous Administration” are equally bound human rights obligations.

A number of commentators support the notion that human rights obligations bind also non-state actors such as armed groups, especially when such groups exercise significant control over territory and population and have an identifiable political structure, like the Autonomous Administration.<sup>4</sup> In addition, in the last two decades the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions calling on non-state actors involved in armed conflicts to cease violations of human rights, therefore implying the

<sup>1</sup> International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), *Tadic*, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, para 70.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> The Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts project of the Geneva Academy of IHL and Human Rights does not list the YPG and the KNC as opposing parties in a non-international armed conflict in Syria.

<sup>4</sup> See C. Tomuschat, A. Clapham, P. Alston, D. Murray. Murray lists the two following conditions: “the armed group must exist independently and must be sufficiently organised that it can impose its will on its members”.



applicability of human rights obligations on non-state actors.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the UN Security Council in its resolution 2139 (2014) reaffirmed the obligations of all parties to the Syrian conflict “under international humanitarian law and *international human rights law*”, thus clearing any doubt as to the applicability of human rights law obligations to the PYD/ Autonomous Administration.<sup>6</sup>

The fact that non-state actors are bound by human rights obligations does not mean that they can be treated in the same manner as states. In most cases, non-state actors do not have the capacity to fully ensure the applicability of international human rights in the territory under their control and it would be inappropriate to expect so. With this in mind, the consensus between commentators is that the extent to which human rights obligations apply to non-state actors is context-dependent.<sup>7</sup> Human rights obligations can be progressively applied to armed groups, depending on the extent to which they have displaced the state authority.<sup>8</sup> Non-state actors that have effectively displaced the state authority and who exercise exclusive control over a territory and population, such as the PYD, are therefore subject to significantly greater human rights obligations than a guerrilla group at the initial stages of insurgency.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that even non-state actors with a lesser degree of control over the territory are bound by fundamental human rights such as the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty.<sup>10</sup>

## Alleged Violations

The report describes a number of incidents in which members of the KNC were arrested and detained for prolonged periods of time and offices of political parties affiliated with the KNC were closed by the Pro- Autonomous Administration “Asayesh Forces” in different areas of the so called “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria” due to the lack of appropriate licences. The acts described represent respectively a violation of the right of freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty enshrined in Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and a violation of the right of freedom of association enshrined in Article 22 of the ICCPR.

### FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY

The freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty is universally considered to be a fundamental human right.<sup>11</sup> Against this background, it is safe to conclude that the PYD is bound by the prohibition of arbitrary detention.

<sup>5</sup> See UN Security Council Resolution 1216(1998) and 1509(2003).

<sup>6</sup> UN SC Resolution 2139(2014) para 2.

<sup>7</sup> D. Murray, “Human rights obligations of non-state armed groups”, EJIL Talk, 2 November 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> A. Clapham, “Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations”, IRR 863(2006), 504,505.

<sup>11</sup> Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, A/HRC/22/44, 24 December 2012.



From the testimonies it appears that individuals arrested by Ayesha are usually not informed, at the time of their arrest, of the reason for their arrest and of any charges brought against them and are usually held for a prolonged period of time before being brought before a judicial authority. The acts described are manifestly in breach of the obligation to inform “anyone who is arrested, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and [...] of any charges against him”<sup>12</sup> and of the right of each detainee “to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful”<sup>13</sup>.

From the report it is also unclear whether the grounds for the arrests are established by law, thus representing a potential breach of article 9 (1) ICCPR. In this regard, it is important to stress that in order for a deprivation of liberty not to be arbitrary, it is not sufficient that it is not against the law. The notion of arbitrariness must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.<sup>14</sup>

### FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

In order to determine whether the PYD is bound by the obligation to respect the right of freedom of association, a parallelism can be drawn between the PYD and the Sri Lankan armed group Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Philip Alston, the former UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions when reporting on the conflict in Sri Lanka noted that the LTTE has a dual nature: “on the one hand, it is an organization with effective control over a significant stretch of territory, engaged in civil planning and administration, maintaining its own form of police force and judiciary [...] and on the other hand it is an armed group”.<sup>15</sup> In his analysis Alston considered the LTTE to be bound by the human rights obligations of “respect for the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and freedom of association with others”.<sup>16</sup> The PYD enjoys a degree of control over Northern Syria and has an organisation comparable to the LTTE.<sup>17</sup> It follows that the conclusion drawn by Alston with regard to the LTTE are equally applicable to the PYD.

### The Autonomous Administration must respect the right to freedom of association of individuals living in the territory under its control

The right of freedom of association is closely linked to the right of freedom of assembly (Article 21 ICCPR) and the right of freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR). These rights are not absolute rights, but can be restricted on certain grounds. Pursuant to Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the ICCPR restrictions to such rights “must be prescribed by law and must be necessary in a democratic society in the

<sup>12</sup> ICCPR, Article 9(2).

<sup>13</sup> ICCPR, Article 9(4).

<sup>14</sup> Human Rights Committee, General Comment no 35, para 12.

<sup>15</sup> UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5, 27 March 2006, para 27.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, para 85.

<sup>17</sup> Chatham House, “Governing Rojava Layers of Legitimacy in Syria”, Research Paper, 2016.

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-12-08-governing-rojava-khalaf.pdf>





interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

In order to determine if the acts of Pro- Autonomous Administration “Asayesh Forces” constitute a breach of Article 22 ICCPR, it is necessary to establish whether the lack of an appropriate licence is a legitimate reason to close a political party. As stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association stated, political parties have “a decision-making role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy”, therefore there is a presumption in favour of formation of political parties and adverse decisions should be strictly justified.<sup>18</sup> Although not directly binding on Syria, but persuasive to say the least, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that requirements for registration do not, in themselves, represent a violation of the right to free association.<sup>19</sup> However, while registration as a political party is required, substantive registration requirements and procedural steps for registration should be reasonable and must be necessary to achieve legitimate aims necessary in a democratic society.<sup>20</sup>

The Human Rights Committee (HRC) in separate cases<sup>21</sup> involving Belarus which have a degree of similarity with the incidents under examination stated that the denial of registration of an association on the basis of a number of reasons prescribed by the law might still constitute a breach of the right of freedom of association. In the view of the HRC, the state must demonstrate that the closure of the association is necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.<sup>22</sup> The state must further demonstrate that the prohibition of an association is necessary to avert a real and not only hypothetical threat to national security or democratic order, that less intrusive measures would be insufficient to achieve the same purpose, and that the restriction is proportionate to the interest to be protected.<sup>23</sup>

In light of the above, it can be concluded that the closure of offices of political parties affiliated to the KNC by the PYD constitutes a breach of the latter’s obligation to respect the freedom of association of the individuals in the territory under its control.

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<sup>18</sup> UN Doc. A/68/299 of 7 August 2013.

<sup>19</sup> OSCE, Guidelines on Political Parties Regulation, 2011, para 65.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, para 66.

<sup>21</sup> HRC, Kalyakin v Belarus, Communication No. 2153/2012; HRC, Volchek v Belarus, Communication No. 1993/2010.

<sup>22</sup> Kalyakin v Belarus, para 9.3.

<sup>23</sup> Volchek v Belarus, para 7.3



## Dozens of Arbitrary Arrests Accompanied the Closure of Headquarters and Offices

Shutting down headquarters of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish parties in Jazeera region was accompanied by dozens of arbitrary arrests against members of the parties or their loyalists, many of whom are still under arrest as of the writing of this report<sup>24</sup>. Mohsen Taher was one of the activists arrested in May 2017 remains in custody while others were released. The most two recently arrested were Bashar Amin, a member of the Political Bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party/PDK-Syria, and Amin Hussam, a member of the General Secretariat of KNC, but were released two months following the arrest.

Amin Hussam, an activist, talked to STJ about the arrest and the storming of their office:

*The Asayesh forces arrested me on May 9, 2017, when they stormed our office, located in the Siyahi district in the center of Qamishli, in a military and awkward way. More than 50 force members surrounded the office and blocked the main street. They then took me, with other 12 members, to Garkin prison in the west of Qamishli. The next day, 10 members of the General Secretariat of KNC were released, but Bashar Amin, a member of the political Bureau of the [Kurdistan Democratic Union Party/PDK-Syria](#), Mohsen Taher, a member of PDK (who is still detained until writing this report)<sup>25</sup>, along with Fasla Yousef, vice-President of the KNC remained in prison. Later, Fasla Yousef was transferred to Rmylan prison, whereas I stayed with Mohsen Taher in Garkin prison for 22 days. Then they transferred us to Alayah prison, east of Qamishli where we stayed for 41 days.”*

Concerning the interrogation, Amin Hussam added that they were interrogated for about two hours while blindfolded. The questioning concerned the status of KNC, Astana and Geneva conferences. He also noted that the decision to arrest members of the KNC was a political decision made by the Autonomous Administration, as was demonstrated during the interrogation.

He said:

*“On the last day of our detention we were transferred to the Attorney General where they investigated about the failure of obtaining licenses for our offices. I personally replied that our offices are licensed according to the agreements we concluded with the Autonomous Administration*

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<sup>24</sup> Late July 2017

<sup>25</sup> STJ's reporter conducted the interview on July17, 2017



*officials. Therefore, they released me along with Bashar Amin that day given my bad health condition and migraine disease.”*

At the end of his interview, Amin Hussam denied any attempts to obtain licenses for the Kurdish National Council parties. He noted that the Howler I Agreement<sup>26</sup> on July 10, 2012, and the Howler II Agreement<sup>27</sup> on October 23, 2013, in addition to the Duhok Agreement<sup>28</sup> on October 22, 2014, do not require a license from the Autonomous Administration. Amin said that withdrawal of the Autonomous Administration from those agreements is its own problem.

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<sup>26</sup> It was an agreement between the KNC on the one hand and the Democratic Community Movement/TEV-DEM on governing the Kurdish-majority region in Syria, under the auspice of Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

<sup>27</sup> Howler II Agreement was between the KNC and the People's Council of West Kurdistan/PCWK to agree on administrating the Kurdish-majority region in northeastern Syria, under the auspice of Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq. The agreement includes formation of a Kurdish Supreme Committee that is made up of an equal number of 10 members between the two councils (five of each council). It is responsible for putting the next stage policies, and it is not affiliated with any parties but an affiliate to KNC and PCWK. It is also responsible for the formation of three specialized committees that are subordinate to the Supreme Committee, they are the Committee of National and Foreign Relations, the Security Committee and the Service and Field Committee.

<sup>28</sup> The Duhok Agreement stipulated three basic items concerning the KNC involvement in the Autonomous Administration that was declared in 2014 by the Kurdistan Union Party/KUP with the participation of Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian parties in the predominantly Kurdish areas northeastern Syria. The second item stated formation of a Kurdish political reference of equal 40% between the 2 signatories, and 20% for the independent. The third item stipulated that the duty of defending and protecting Rojava is a task over all parties, and so formed a specialized military corps that will coordinate with the People's Protection Units to find ways and mechanisms to participate in defending Rojava.



Image shows Mohsen Taher, a member of the Political Bureau of PDK, before being arrested by the Asayesh forces. Taken in front of the main office of KNC in the Siyahi district, Qamishli, on May 2, 2017.

Photo Credit: Local activists from the city.



In another testimonial to STJ, Bashar Amin, 70, a member of PDK, confirmed that the pro-Autonomous Administration Asayesh Forces released him on Monday evening July 10, 2017 after being abducted on May 20, 2017. He said:

*“At night the Asayesh Forces broke into my house in al-Matar neighborhood in [Al-Hasakeh](#). They fully surrounded it. Some elements got out of the car, asked me to accompany them, and drove me to the northern Asayesh section where I stayed about ten days. Then they transferred me to Alayah prison in Qamishli. They did not explain the reason of my arrest during the interrogation, but they were hinting at the cause without clarifying it, namely the [decision of the Kurdish National Council](#), which was proclaimed at a press conference on May 14, 2017, to demand reopening the offices that have already been shut down by the Asayesh forces.”*

Amin stated that he suffered a lot given the poor conditions of detention in both the dormitories and solitaires, as well as a lack care about the conditions of detainees. However, Amin believed that his release was due to demands of international organizations such as Amnesty International, the United Nations, and other human rights organizations, as well as due to his old age. Bashar Amin added that many of his colleagues are still in the Autonomous Administration jails, such as Barzan Hussein, a journalist, Fouad Ibrahim, a member in the Local Council in Derek/al-Malikiayah, as well as Abdurrahman Apo, a leader in the Kurdish Council in Afrin.

**However, the STJ reporter was informed that the Asayesh forces released a number of the detainees because of their bad health. They released Suleiman Oso, a member of the Kurdish Democratic political Union/Yekiti on June 24, 2017, in addition to Nafe' Abdallah, a member of the Central Committee of PDK-Syria.**

## Continue Closure of Kurdish National Council Offices and their Affiliated Parties since March 2017

The Autonomous Administration had closed, following the security campaign, more than 30 offices and headquarters. Mr. Abdurrahman Abtan, a member of the Central Committee of PDK-Syria,



asserts that Asayesh had shut down offices of KNC until the date of this report<sup>29</sup>. He noted that the supporters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) burnt and stormed their headquarters shortly before they were sealed with red wax by the Asayesh forces on March 14, 2017. He added:

*"Arresting politicians and closing the party's offices are condemnable acts and also against human rights. We did not attempt to obtain licenses for our parties as we do not recognize the legitimacy of the Autonomous Administration in the Kurdish areas given it is declared by only one political party without the participation of other political parties in the region. This administration imposes its laws by force of arms and it is impossible for our parties to be registered by it."*

In a confirmed testimonial, a member of the PDK-Syria, who declined to disclose his name for security purposes, stated that on March 14, 2017, two patrols of the Asayesh forces raided offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party/PDK, asked all its members to get out in order to shut it down under the laws of Autonomous Administration. He said:

*"The military men treated us in a very abusive manner, as they insulted the national Kurds symbols and accused the party and the KNC that they were dealing with external anti-Autonomous Administration parties. Moreover, they threatened to arrest us if we tried to reopen the office. Then they inspected the whole office and took a number of documents and electronic equipment. Finally, they closed the office and pasted a paper indicating that they must be reviewed by the Autonomous Administration."*

In turn, Ibrahim Bro<sup>30</sup>, the president of the KNC, told STJ about the closure of the offices of the KNC, saying:

*"This is not the first time that the PYD closed our offices. Three years ago, the Autonomous Administration shut down the offices, arrested leaders of the Council, and exiled them outside Syria. Currently, the number of closed offices belonging to Kurdish National Council parties and organizations exceeded 40, in addition to local KNC offices in Jazira canton and in Kokanee/Ayn al-Arab. In return, we decided to reopen those offices again. The Yekiti party has opened an office in Amuda but PYD arrested the leaders and closed the office again, as well as the Office of KNC in Qamishli."*

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<sup>29</sup> Late July 2017

<sup>30</sup> STJ reporter conducted the interview by phone on May 8, 2017.



Image shows insulting phrases written by supporters of the PYD on walls of the Kurdish Union party/Yekiti office east of Qamishli on March 4, 2017.

Photo Credit: Yekiti Media Center in Syria.

Barzan Shekhmous, a [Yekiti Media](#) journalist, told STJ that KNC did not apply for the license due to political reasons concerning the illegitimacy of Autonomous Administration. He said:

“The Autonomous Administration was not able to conduct any genuine elections, even to its legitimate body, under international, regional or national monitoring until this moment. Instead, it still depends on force and arms in its governance. However, the PYD is trying to gain legitimacy from Kurdish National Council/KNC , which in turn tries to obtain real gains, mainly inserting “the Rojava Peshmerga” to Kurdistan of Syria in order to give legitimacy to this administration, and also to be a genuine reliable powerful partner on the ground.”



## Storming Offices of the Kurdish National Council/KNC and Burning Them

Practices of the pro-Autonomous Administration military forces were not confined to just shutting down offices of the opposition Kurdish Parties, they also extended to prompting some of the affiliate armed groups, specifically the Rojava Youth Union which is one of the youth organizations of Democratic Community movement/TEV-DEM, to attack and burn offices of those parties.

Yekiti Media Center posted on its own Facebook account a [videotape](#) on 3 March 2017, that showed the burning of Yekiti party's office in the east of Qamishli, named Suleiman Adi Forum, and breaking all its contents. The media center additionally accused the Rojava Youth Union, known by “Ciwanên Şoreşger” as well as being affiliated to PYD, of the arson attack.

While another [videotape](#), also published by the center on March 8, 2017, showed the pro-PYD Rojava Youth Union attacking the [celebration](#) called for by the local council in al-Darbasiyah on Women's Day. A member of the Kurdish Yekiti party, whose identity is withheld for security purposes and who was near the party office in the east of Qamishli when a group of Rojava Youth Union affiliated to PYD attacked the office on March 3, 2017, said:

“We were surprised when a group of “young men” came with a patrol of al- Antariyah neighborhood’s Asayesh forces. They broke the door of the office, entered it, broke all of its contents, and burned all of its rooms, in addition to writing hate slogans, and saying bad words to the leaderships of the KNC as well as leadership of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq KRG. They asked everyone to go away, otherwise they will assault and arrest them. Moreover, before their departure, they lowered the Kurdish flag and attempted to attack the office of the local KNC near Yekiti Party office, but they failed since the local office is a vault and it is difficult to enter if it is closed. The Asayesh forces stayed around the two offices for hours until a fire truck arrived to extinguish the fire.”





Images show the damage done to Yekiti party's office east of Qamishli after a group loyal to PYD assaulted and burned it.

Source: Yekiti Media Center



## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN QAMISHLI BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of Yekiti party in Syria located in the eastern district in Qamishli was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of Yekiti party in Syria located in the western district in Qamishli was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. Office of PDK-Syria located in the eastern district in Qamishli was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
4. Office of Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria was shut down on March 15, 2017.
5. Office of the local KNC in Syria was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.
6. Office of the local KNC in Syria located in the eastern district was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.
7. Office of local KNC in Syria located in the western district was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED AL-MALIKIYAH / DERIK BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of Students & Youth Union of Democratic Kurdistani-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of the local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
4. The Kurdistan Women Union/KWU headquarter was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
5. Office of Yekiti Party-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
6. Office of Kurdish Youth Movement/TCK was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
7. Office of Kurdish Youth Movement/TCK (2) was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.
8. Office of Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party-Syria, was shut down on March 15, 2017.



## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN AMUDA BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of Yekiti Party-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. Office of Students & Youth Union of Democratic Kurdistan -Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
4. Office of the local KNC in Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN AL-HASAKEH BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of Yekiti Party-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. Office of the local KNC located in the eastern district was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
4. Office of the local KNC located in the western district was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN AL-QAHTANIYAH/TURBE SIPI BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of the local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. The Civil Society office in Turbe Sipi was shut down on March 15, 2017.



## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN TEL TAMER BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of the local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Cigerxwîn Forum for Arts and Culture was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.
3. Office of Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 17, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN MAABADAH/GIRKÊ LEGÊ BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of the local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of Yekiti party-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
3. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017
4. Office of the Kurdish Reform Movement-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN AL-DARBASIYAH BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of the local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.
2. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.

## A LIST OF THE HEADQUARTERS CLOSED IN AL-JAWADIYAH/ÇIL AXA BY AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATION SINCE MARCH 2017

1. Office of local KNC was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.
2. Office of PDK-Syria was sealed with red wax on March 15, 2017.

The office of local KNC in the city of Ras al-Ayn/Sari Kani was also sealed with red wax on March 14, 2017.



## Some Assaults Conducted by Rojava Youth Union since March 2017

1. The attack on office of Yekiti Party in Syria located in the eastern District in Qamishli, the sabotage of its contents and writing abusive words and slogans on 8 March.
2. The attack and burn of office of PDK-Syria located in the eastern district in Qamishli on 8 March.
3. Storming the local KNC office in Maabadah (Girkê Legê) on the International Women's Day and disperse of celebrants by force on 8 March.
4. Storming the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party office in Syria during the celebration of Women's Day and break-up of the celebration in al-Darbasiyah on 8 March.
5. The attack on the local KNC office in Ras al-Ayn/Sari Kani and the sabotage of its contents. Moreover, they assaulted and beat both Mr. Badran Mesto, a leader in the Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria, and Mr. Isa Haj Taha, a member of the local KNC on 8 March.
6. Burning the local KNC office in Amuda on 8 March.
7. The attack on Yekiti party office in al-Hasakeh with Molotov cocktails on 7 March.
8. Storming the Yekiti Party office in Syria in Qamishli and lowering the Kurdish flag from the top of the building on 6 March.
9. Storming and assaulting KNC office in Ras al-Ayn/Sari Kani on 6 March.
10. Threatening the local KNC members in Ras al-Ayn/Sari Kani, and writing abusive slogans on walls of the local council on 4 March.
11. The group put a cloth with a piece of soap and a "Kalashnikov shot" in front of PDK office-Syria, aiming at physical liquidation on 4 March.
12. The burn and sabotage of the Kurdish Yekiti party office in Syria in Qamishli on 3 March.
13. Writing abusive slogans against the KNC and Kurdish leaders on walls of Yekiti Party office in Syria located in the western area of Qamishli on 3 March.
14. Storming the PDK Western office-Syria in Qamishli and sabotaging its contents on 3 March.
- 15- Storming the local KNC office and lowering the Kurdish flag from over the center on 3 March.
16. Storming the local KNC office, lowering the Kurdish flag and writing abusive slogans on its walls on 3 March.