{"id":7221,"date":"2019-11-20T18:52:05","date_gmt":"2019-11-20T15:52:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stj-sy.org\/the-prospect-of-a-peacekeeping-operation-in-syria\/"},"modified":"2019-12-12T23:53:32","modified_gmt":"2019-12-12T20:53:32","slug":"the-prospect-of-a-peacekeeping-operation-in-syria","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stj-sy.org\/en\/the-prospect-of-a-peacekeeping-operation-in-syria\/","title":{"rendered":"The prospect of a peacekeeping operation in Syria"},"content":{"rendered":"

On 9 October 2019, Turkey announced the launching of its Peace Spring Operation over the territory of Northeast Syria. Since then, 175.000 persons have been displaced. At least 120 civilians have been killed, while Amnesty International has accused Turkey and its allied forces of war crimes and other serious violations of international law.[1]<\/a><\/p>\r\n

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Numerous deals between different state and non-state parties to the conflict have ensued. On 17 October, the White House announced an \u201cagreement putting an end to a week of hostilities in the border region of Syria\u201d.[2]<\/a><\/p>\r\n<\/blockquote>\r\n

The latest development occurred on the 22 October, when Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Putin met in Sochi, Russia, and agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding maintaining the Turkish presence in the current Peace Spring Operation area, to deploy Russian military police and Syrian border guards on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border, to remove any YPG presence to a depth of 30 km from the border and to start joint Turkish-Russian patrols in the border area. Despite this agreement, acts of warfare continue to be conducted on a daily basis, putting at risk the life of civilians. The illegal use of force also creates conditions for a new state armed conflict involving Turkey in a region that had against all odds managed to provide a sense of democracy and security to its population.<\/p>\r\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The peacekeeping mission implemented by Russia and Turkey in Idleb has proven insufficient. Hayat Tahrir al Sham, who was deemed to leave the area according to the deal, expanded its reach, joint Russia-Turkey patrols provided for by the deal were never able to access the area, and the Syrian government resumed its offensive on the region in April 2019.[3]<\/a> The UN Security Council\u2019s mandate, provided for by Article 24 of the UN Charter, to maintain international peace and security, commends a prompt action, in line with the Commission of Inquiry\u2019s call for a halt to violence in Syria.[4]<\/a> On the basis of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter, what could the deployment of a peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Northeast Syria look like?<\/p>\r\n

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\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Past experiences of PKO in various contexts and areas provide significant insights into critical aspects of PKOs, that advocates and drafters of a potential deployment could reflect on in order to increase the potential for success of the operation, with particular regards to the principles on the basis of which the mandate is drafted, the mandate itself, the resources allocated to the operation, and the geographic area of the operation.<\/p>\r\n

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