{"id":17487,"date":"2022-06-28T04:59:31","date_gmt":"2022-06-28T01:59:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/stj-sy.org\/northeastern-syria-government-agencies-withhold-tens-of-thousands-of-un-aid-baskets\/"},"modified":"2023-03-28T13:22:01","modified_gmt":"2023-03-28T10:22:01","slug":"northeastern-syria-government-agencies-withhold-tens-of-thousands-of-un-aid-baskets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stj-sy.org\/en\/northeastern-syria-government-agencies-withhold-tens-of-thousands-of-un-aid-baskets\/","title":{"rendered":"Northeastern Syria: Government Agencies Withhold Tens of Thousands of UN Aid Baskets"},"content":{"rendered":"

Background<\/strong><\/h4>\n

On 11 January 2011, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued Resolution 2504<\/a>, relative to UN aid delivery to Syria. The resolution put another political tool in the hands of the Syrian government (SG), used to tighten its grip over populations across northeastern Syria and local authorities alike.[1]<\/sup><\/a> The resolution warrants the SG to establish a monopoly over the delivery of UN aid allocated to the region. Relief is transferred exclusively by the SG and from SG-held areas, in coordination with the UN Damascus Office, and UN agencies\u2019 partners, including humanitarian organizations and associations.<\/p>\n

Under the resolution, the SG\u2019s monopoly stretches beyond aid, also covering development and service projects.<\/p>\n

The political weaponization of aid delivery by the SG has been firmly established as the al-Yaroubiya\/ Tal Koujar crossing remains shut, and when the Syria-Turkey Bab al-Salameh crossing was blocked following Resolution 2533<\/a>, adopted by the UN Security Council on 11 July 2020. The resolution authorizes the UN to continue delivering aid to northwestern Syria only through Bab al-Hawa and through cross-lines marking the different territories of control across Syria.<\/p>\n

Introduction <\/strong><\/h5>\n

In this report, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) documents the ongoing trends of exploitation and control governing UN aid delivery since January 2020, when al-Yaroubiya\/ Tal Koujar border crossing was first blocked.<\/p>\n

For the purposes of the report, STJ conducted extensive interviews in 2022 with two groups of aid workers. The first group encompasses three workers from UN agencies: the first supervised aid distribution in northeastern Syria, the second was an employee at an aid warehouse south of Qamishli city, and the third was a field supervisor who monitored local aid distribution teams.<\/p>\n

The second group includes employees with local and international organizations operating in northeastern Syria, among them workers with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), and SG-licensed local associations.<\/p>\n

In July 2019, STJ published a report<\/a> documenting how the SARC denied civilians in Daraa and Quneitra provinces access to UN aid. Deprivation of aid was grounded in several pretexts, including that some of the beneficiaries were subject to \u201csecurity reports\u201d, mostly blacklisting them, or for their former affiliation with armed opposition groups. Both pretexts are used against civilians even though the two target provinces signed \u201csettlement\u201d agreements with the SG in 2018 after SG forces took control with Russian military support.<\/p>\n

Notably, the SARC\u2019s exclusionary practices violate the principles of impartiality and independence. These principles stipulate that international organizations remain neutral, do not favor any side in the conflict, and maintain their autonomy of the political objectives of the sides involved in the conflict.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Image (1) – Map marking out the various territories of control, and active and inactive border crossings.<\/p>\n

Testimonies Corroborating Aid Misuse<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Information obtained by STJ demonstrates that the SG and affiliated security services in the cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli have been diverting a portion of UN aid to members of the Syrian army, security agencies, the ruling Ba\u2019ath party, and sometimes their families. This diversion is practiced at the expense of rightful beneficiaries, mostly internally displaced persons (IDPs) residing in camps across the two cities and their suburbs.<\/p>\n

Two factors warrant such misuse. First, UN agencies’ official or semi-official reliance on SG-linked local partners to distribute relief allocations. Second, the transportation of the allocations through SG-controlled routes, via the Qamishli Airport or land roads.<\/p>\n

Even though misuse is confirmed, it remains challenging to fathom the extent of aid appropriation. It is difficult to ascertain the percentage acquired by SG-affiliated Ba\u2019ath Party branches, military, and security agencies because figures on the number of food baskets and medical supplies, especially those meant for combating COVID-19, which arrive in al-Hasakah province monthly, are contested.<\/p>\n

However, based on the data collected for the report, STJ estimates that the number of baskets appropriated is likely in the “tens of thousands”.<\/p>\n

Notably, the interviewed sources expressed their concern about the SG\u2019s use of relief aid and medical supplies, especially COVID-19 vaccines, as a political weapon, while remedies or alternative delivery mechanisms remain lacking.<\/p>\n

The politicization of aid is obvious, particularly when one compares the pace of vaccine delivery across areas of control in Syria. The first batches of the vaccines arrived and were distributed in SG-held areas and opposition-held areas, which access aid through the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. They were received faster in these areas than those held by the Autonomous Administration, whose deliveries are bound by the SG and are transferred through the Qamishli Airport. This comparison does not include the number of undisclosed vaccines which were distributed.<\/p>\n

Local Organizations: A Primary Monopoly Tool<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Several of the interviewees STJ met said that UN agencies\u2019 reliance on local partners (licensed by the SG) is evidence of the manipulation of aid and attempted politicization of relief.<\/p>\n

For aid distribution, the UN and the international organizations it backs depend primarily on the SARC branch in al-Hasakah, Al Birr Association in al-Qamishli, and the Armenian Association, which operates under the supervision of the Relief Subcommittee of the Armenian Church, in addition to a few local associations registered with the SG\u2019s Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The SARC finances the logistics of registered local associations, after it divides the province into geographical sectors, and assigns each sector to an association. However, the SARC remains the largest distributor, in terms of the number of beneficiaries and the geographical scope covered.<\/p>\n

In addition to recruiting SG-influenced local organizations for aid distribution, a report<\/a> by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), published in February 2022, revealed that UN had contracted with pro-Assad businessmen and local paramilitary groups to implement its projects in SG-held areas. The report cited names such as Mohamad Hamsho and Samer Foz, two businessmen known for their loyalty and close ties with the Syrian president. As for military groups, the report mentioned the Aleppo Defenders militia.<\/p>\n

For their part, the Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) obtained documents<\/a> showing the role of SG-affiliated intelligence services in directing humanitarian aid and manipulating its flow \u201cto punish perceived enemy populations.\u201d<\/p>\n

In a related context, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report<\/a> showing how the SG is \u201cco-opting humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance, and in places using it to entrench repressive policies.\u201d<\/p>\n

Distribution Statistics <\/strong><\/h4>\n

An SARC distribution supervisor told STJ that approximately 70,000 families are registered on the SARC\u2019s beneficiary lists in al-Hasakah province. However, he added, only about 85,000 relief baskets arrived in the province as aid allocations in 2021 and 2022. About 44,000 baskets were distributed up to late 2021, and 29,000 baskets were distributed over the first quarter of 2022. The supervisor added:<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u201cA quarter of the reported allocations was not distributed, because security services withhold the larger part of aid in the province\u2019s center. Each operative security service retains a share of aid, whether food or logistics, that are originally meant for affected families at the city center and makeshift housing units.\u201d<\/p>\n

Through field monitoring operations, STJ obtained information indicating that security services often repurpose the seized aid. The command of the National Defense militia confiscates over 40% of the allocations\u2019 bulk. They then sell the \u201cshares\u201d on the black market and use the revenues to pay the salaries of volunteer recruits within their ranks.<\/p>\n

In addition to military appropriation, STJ detected similar patterns of aid seizures within administrative SG circles. Every month, the SG-affiliated al-Hasakah Provincial Directorate (APD) informs other government departments to coordinate with the SARC, asking the organization to send monthly food baskets to government employees. The APD also maintains contact with the Office of Martyrs and the Ba\u2019ath Party Branch to supply families of dead and wounded recruits of the Syrian army with semi-fixed shares of aid. Amidst this diversion, the APD ensures to fill its own warehouses with baskets. At a monthly rate, nearly 500 aid shares are distributed to security and administrative agencies.<\/p>\n

In addition to interviewed sources, STJ collected field testimonies from residents and local relief workers in the area. The accounts revealed the names of other local entities involved in aid misuse. These entities create fake lists, alleging they are of families in need, to access aid. However, no exact figures were reported on the number of names listed, or the size of aid misappropriated.<\/p>\n

Notably, at odds with allocations designated and delivered to the province, family beneficiaries have access to merely 25% of the total allocations once every three months, at a rate of 25% in al-Hasakah city and 75% in its suburbs.<\/p>\n

According to statistics obtained by STJ, aid is distributed every three months at a rate of 1,255 allocations in Tall Tamr town and its suburbs, 1,600 allocations in al-Hasakah\u2019s countryside, and 3,100 allocations channeled to over 12 neighborhoods within al-Hasakah city.<\/p>\n

Additionally, a segment of the designated baskets is reserved for IDPs in al-Hasakah province at a rate of 2,000 allocations, IDPs from Ras al-Ayn\/Ser\u00ea Kaniy\u00ea at an approximate rate of 850 allocations, and 5,000 allocations in al-Shaddadi area, which encompasses Markadah, al-Arishah, and al-Shaddadi towns.<\/p>\n

With this, the total the SARC distributes across the province amounts to 13,805 shares, covering only a fraction of the needs of the organization\u2019s 70,000 registered family beneficiaries.<\/p>\n

Restricting Projects to Specific Areas<\/strong><\/h4>\n

Employees with Qamishli-based UN agencies told STJ that the agencies are encountering some challenges under the control of the Autonomous Administration, which presides over the larger parts of northeastern Syria, especially with obtaining permits to implement UN-led projects. In addition to permits, it remains difficult for agencies to assess needs in areas outside the SG\u2019s control, which hampers relief efforts in these areas.<\/p>\n

However, even when data on the size of need is available, projects continue to be focused in certain areas. During the draught which hit northeastern Syria between 2005 and 2010, most of the SARC\u2019s relief activities, which were carried out in partnership with regional and international organizations, such as the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development and UN organizations, were concentrated in Arab-majority areas in the southern countryside of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, neglecting the Kurdish-majority areas, despite there being reports assessing needs there.<\/p>\n

After 2011, UN programs widened the scope of assessment, seeking to meet the needs of struggling families across the entire region. However, some livelihood programs initiated by the UN Development Program are still concentrated in SG-held areas in the southern countryside of Qamishli.<\/p>\n

Tools for Manipulating Aid <\/strong><\/h4>\n

Several factors play into the SG\u2019s politicization of aid, which it uses to win over populations in certain areas. The SG manages to repurpose aid into a mechanism of political pressure because the UN recognizes the SG as its main courier and coordinator. So long as the al-Yaroubiya\/ Tal Koujar crossing with Iraq remains blocked, and the SG continues to predominate land routes.<\/p>\n

According to testimonies obtained by STJ, the SG resorts to several practices to control, maintain a monopoly over, and manipulate aid:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Pressuring UN Damascus offices to back certain merchants with tenders related to in-kind materials.<\/li>\n
  2. Transferring cash to executive partners through official banks based on the official exchange rate, which is lower than the market rate. A dollar\u2019s purchase rate is 3,955 Syrian Pounds (SYP) and the sell rate is 3,990 SYP on the black market, while the official exchange rate, determined by the Central Bank of Syria<\/a>, was 2,814 pounds per dollar up to 2 April 2022.<\/li>\n
  3. Limiting UN programs to specific associations that have links with relevant ministries, and thus facilitating these associations\u2019 access to official approvals related to the programs.<\/li>\n
  4. Amending laws to enable the SG to support some associations, or bar others, linked to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. For example, church-related associations did not need permits from the ministry to enter into partnerships with the UN. However, the SG later made the permit obligatory and simultaneously denied associations access to it.<\/li>\n
  5. Allowing security branches to exercise absolute authority over UN offices in Qamishli, which are exposed to several provocations, including focusing aid delivery in certain areas and taking bribes from associations that implement projects.<\/li>\n
  6. Obliging UN programs to employ specific persons for security persons or personal gain, in addition to taking bribes and diverting aid.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    UN Programs and Their Locations of Operation<\/strong><\/h4>\n

    UN agencies follow several aid distribution mechanisms, including in-kind deliveries, which constitute over 90% of the total volume of aid, cash programs, or electronic vouchers. A part of the in-kind aid is purchased from Damascus\u2019s markets through tenders. The remaining portion is imported from the agencies\u2019 financing departments located in several European countries, including Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark.<\/p>\n

    Several UN-linked agencies and organizations operate in the areas held by the Autonomous Administration, providing various types of services:<\/p>\n